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Case No. 20090162-CA 
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State of Utah, 
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vs. 
Wayne Jay Bergeson, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for ten counts of sexual exploitation of a 
minor, and five counts of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
I 
Did the trial court properly refuse to hear Defendant's motion to suppress, six 
I 
days before trial, where Defendant failed to file the motion on four prior due dates 
set by the trial court? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's interpretation of a procedural rule is 
reviewed for correctness. In re AM., 2009 UT App 118, f 9, 208 P.3d 1058 (citing 
Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, ^ 5,989 P.2d 1073). The trial court's "inherent power to 
manage its docket . . . is reviewed for an abuse of discretion/' Clayton v. Ford Motor 
Co., 2009 UT App 154, f 9, 214 P.3d 865. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12: 
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or 
request, including request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, 
which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue 
may be raised prior to trial by written motion. 
(c)(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the 
trial:. . . 
(c)(1)(B) motions to suppress evidencef.] 
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to 
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by 
the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown 
may grant relief from such waiver. 
Utah R.Evid. 103: 
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a 
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of a 
party is affected[.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, a 
second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5A-3 (West 2004), and 
2 
five counts of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1Q-503 (West 2004). R9-13. 
In the year preceding trial, Defendant missed tour court-set due dates for the 
filing of a motion to suppress. See R199:7; see also R46, R59, R106, R116. At a July 
2008 pretrial conference, the trial court expressed frustration that the motion to 
suppress —due six weeks earlier —had not been filed. R198:6-7; see also R122. 
Nevertheless, the trial court stated there was a"possibility" it would consider a later 
filed motion. R198:8. Approximately three months later, on 3 October 2008, 
I 
Defendant filed the motion to suppress. R124-25. The supporting memorandum 
I 
was filed three days later, on 6 October 2008. Rl26-35. At the final pretrial 
i 
conference on 10 October 2008, the trial court refused t6 hear the motion on the 
ground it was untimely. R199:7,10; see also R136-37. 
Defendant's trial on the first ten counts (sexual exploitation of a minor), was 
severed from his trial on the last five counts (possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person). Following a two-day jury trial, Defendant was convicted as 
charged on counts one through ten. R156-57; see also R149-152. Following a one-day 
bench trial, Defendant was convicted as charged on counts eleven through fifteen. 
Rl82-83. The trial court imposed the statutory prison term of from one-to-fifteen 
years for counts one through ten. Rl89-90. The trial cpurt also imposed the 
3 
statutory prison term of from one-to-fifteen years for counts eleven through fifteen. 
Rl90-91. The trial court ordered that counts one and two run consecutively to each 
other, and that counts eleven and twelve run consecutively to each other and to 
counts one and two. R191. The trial court ordered that the remaining counts run 
concurrently. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Over 6500 pictures and videos of child pornography were found on CDs and 
computers seized from Defendant's home. R5; see also R197:8-10. 
Detective Buhman is an investigator for the Salt Lake City Police Department, 
and member of the Utah Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force. Rl; R197:3. 
Through use of a peer to peer network that allows users to share computer files over 
the internet, Detective Buhman obtained information that child pornography was 
being downloaded to LP. address 67.161.249.138. R2; R197:4-5. Based on this 
information, Detective Buhman obtained an investigative subpoena for Comcast 
Cable. R2; R197:5. Comcast identified Defendant as the subscriber to whom the LP. 
address belonged. R2; R197:5. Based on this information, Detective Buhman 
obtained a search warrant for Defendant's residence. R197:5. 
1
 The trial transcript is not part of the record on appeal; accordingly, the facts 
are taken from the probable cause statement (Rl-8) and the preliminary hearing 
transcript (R197). 
4 
Task force members executing the search warrant repeatedly knocked on 
Defendant's door, announcing both their identity, that they had a search 
warrant. R2-3. When no one responded, the officers made a forced entry. R3. 
Defendant was found inside the home and handcuffed. Id. Child pornography was 
found on computers in Defendant's kitchen and front room dining area. Id. Officers 
seized two desktop computers, one laptop, and some hard drives. R197:10. 
Once the home was secured, Defendant was intepiewed. R3; R197:6-7. He 
indicated that he stored and saved videos and files on the CDs stacked next to the 
I 
computers, but denied that he burned child pornography to the CDs. R4. 
Defendant also stated that he lived in the home alone. Id. Defendant admitted that 
he kept the child pornography as a novelty, but denied that he was a collector. Id. 
Rather, he claimed "that it would just come through the internet," and that he had 
I 
"received it through emails and group accounts." R197:9r When asked why he had 
I 
more child pornography than music on his computer, Defendant said that he only 
tries to download music, which he puts on his Ipod and then deletes from his 
computer. R4. 
Investigating officers also found four rifles, one shotgun, and nine millimeter 
ammunition. Id; R197:8. Defendant had a prior conviction for forcible sexual abuse 
and kidnapping. R4. When asked about his prior convictions and keeping the guns, 
Defendant said that "he did not think anyone would have a reason to come look for 
the guns." Id. 
In all, 1700 videos of child pornography were found on the approximately 178 
CDs recovered from Defendant's home. R5; R197:8. Approximately 3500 pictures 
and 1300 videos of child pornography were found on the computers. R197:10. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled that Defendant's motion to suppress, filed only 
six days before trial, was untimely. Over the preceding year, Defendant had missed 
four court-set due dates for the motion. While rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, states that a motion to suppress must be filed at least five days before 
trial, it also provides that the trial court may set an earlier due date. Thus, the five-
day provision is a default provision, which governs only when the trial court has 
not set an earlier due date. 
Moreover, Defendant mischaracterizes the record when he states that the trial 
court specifically stated it would allow the motion to suppress to be filed before 
trial, and that it would address the motion. The trial court never unequivocally 
stated that it would hear Defendant's motion if, notwithstanding the prior failures 
to file, it was filed five days before trial. At most, the trial court expressed that it 
would consider that possibility. The trial court ultimately refused to excuse 
6 
Defendant's failure to timely file the motion, however, because it was dissatisfied 
with Defendant's untimely and general request. 
Finally, Defendant does not assert on appeal that he suffered any prejudice 
from the trial court's refusal to hear the motion, or that it would have been 
successful. This is grounds alone upon which to affirm the trial court's ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO HEAR 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS, FILED SIX DAYS 
BEFORE TRIAL, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT SET FOUR PRIOR 
DUE DATES FOR THE MOTION THAT DEFENDANT MISSED 
Defendant complains that the trial court erred in refusing to entertain his 
I 
motion to suppress where it was ''filed at least five business days before trial/7 Aplt. 
Br. at 15 (bolding and capitalization omitted). Defendant argues that under rule 12, 
i 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provision governs motions, the trial court 
was required to entertain his motion. Aplt. Br. at 15. Defendant's argument ignores 
that he had already failed to meet four previous deadlines for the motion set by the 
trial court and that rule 12 expressly permits the trial court to set either an earlier or 
later deadline. 
A. Proceedings below. 
The trial court, here, set four due dates for the filing of Defendant's motion to 
suppress, none of which Defendant met. The first due date was 7 September 2007, 
7 
the second due date was 9 November 2007, the third due date was 16 May 2008, and 
the fourth due date was 13 June 2008. R199:7; R46, R59, R106, R116. 
At a pretrial conference held on 21 July 2008, the trial court noted the absence 
of any motion to suppress and reminded defense counsel that the case had first been 
set for trial a year earlier and that the trial date had been reset three different times. 
R198:3, 6-7. The trial court noted that although the motion to suppress was 
scheduled to have been filed six weeks before the July hearing, defense counsel had 
failed to contact the court about the missed due date or request any extension of 
time. Rl98:6-7. The trial court found counsel's explanation—that "more facts" were 
needed to draft a "meaningful" motion—both untimely and "really general." 
R198:5-9. The trial court then set a final trial date for 14 October 2008. Id. at 7. 
Citing rule 12, defense counsel noted that a motion to suppress "can still be filed 
within five days before trial." Id. The trial court stated that this was not preferable, 
but that it was "a possibility" the court was "willing to consider." Id. at 8. 
Approximately three months later, on 3 October 2008, Defendant filed the 
motion to suppress. Rl24-25. But he did not file the supporting memorandum until 
8 
three days later, on 6 October 2008. R126-35.2 At the filial pretrial conference, held 
on 10 October 2008, the trial court refused to hear the motion to suppress on the 
ground that it was untimely. R199:6. 
Defense counsel argued that the motion had been filed more than five 
business days before trial—set for the 14th—was timely under rule 12(c). Id.; see also 
R124-25.3 The prosecutor conceded that rule 12 authorised the filing of a motion at 
least five days before trial, but noted that Defendant had failed to file the motion on 
several prior dates set by the court. R199:6. 
The trial court found that it had set four previous dates for the motion to be 
filed that had gone unmet. Id. at 7. Given Defendant's failure to timely file the 
motion to suppress, the trial court refused to hear the motion, ruling that the case 
would proceed to trial. Id.; see also id. at 10. 
2
 Defendant asserts that the motion and memorandum were filed at the same 
time and "speculat[es]" that "a clerk may have separated the documents and 
docketed the memorandum apart from the motion/' Aplt; Br. at 15 n.6; see also id. at 
9n.2. | 
3
 Defendant attaches unsigned copies of the motion to suppress and 
supporting memorandum to his brief. These are not the record copies, however, 
and should therefore be stricken as extraneous evidence. See State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 
8, f^ 7,974 P.2d 279 (striking extraneous evidence attached! to Pliego's brief); see also 
State v. Law, 2003 UT App 228, \ 2, 75 P.3d 923 (declining to consider extraneous 
documents attached to Law's brief). 
9 
B. The trial court was not required to hear Defendant's motion. 
Defendant argues that his motion was timely under rule 12(c), and that the 
trial court was therefore required to entertain it. Aplt. Br. at 15-17. Defendant 
further asserts that the trial court "specifically stated that she would . . . address [the 
motion] at trial/' Aplt. Br. at 19. Neither the plain language of rule 12 nor the facts 
of this case required the trial court to hear Defendant's motion. Rather, the trial 
court acted well within its discretion to refuse to hear the motion after Defendant 
had repeatedly missed filing deadlines over the prior year. 
Rule 12 governs the filing of pretrial motions. Rule 12(c)(1)(B) provides that 
"a motion to suppress evidence" "shall be filed at least five days prior to the trial." 
Rule 12(f) authorizes the trial court to set its own timetable for filing pretrial 
motions, and that if the court-set time is not met, any defense or objection is waived: 
Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to 
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the 
court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may 
grant relief from such waiver. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f) (emphasis added). 
" [This Court] interprets] a court rule in accordance with its plain meaning, 
and [also] construe[s] the rule so that it is in harmony with related rules." State v. 
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, If 15,147 P.3d 1176 (citing Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, | 
10 
19,133 P.3d 370 and State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, f 29,127 P.3d 682); see also Nemelka 
v: Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, 2009 UT 33, f 12, 212 
P.3d 525. According to a plain and harmonious reading of rule 12, subsection (c) 
sets a default time for filing a motion to suppress, "at least five days before trial/7 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) & (f). But when the trial court sets an earlier time for filing a 
motion to suppress, the court-set time trumps subsection (c)'s default time. And 
failure to meet the court-set time "shall constitute waiver/' Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f). 
The court, however, "for cause shown may grant relief jfrom such waiver/' Id. 
In other words, while rule 12(c) sets a default deadline for filing motions, it 
affords a trial court discretion to manage its trial calendar by allowing it to set its 
own pretrial deadlines for motions. It also affords the trial court discretion to 
excuse a party's failure to comply with its deadline. This is consistent with a trial 
court's traditional discretion to control and manage its calendar. See, e.g., Clayton v. 
Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT App 154, If 9, 214 P.3d 865 ("The trial court's decision to 
bifurcate a trial falls within its inherent power to manage its docket"); State v. 
Newell, 210 P.3d 1283, 1286 (Ariz. App. 2009) (recognizing courts have inherent 
power to manage their calendars and promote orderly and expeditious handling of 
cases). 
11 
Contrary to Defendant's argument, the trial court's reading of rule 12 did not 
render either subsection (c) or subsection (f) "inoperative or superfluous, void or 
insignificant." State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, f 9, 217 P.3d 265 (quoting Brickyard 
Homeowners' Ass'n Mgmt. Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535,538 (Utah 1983)). 
Indeed, one subsection does not destroy the other. See id. Rather, each subsection is 
afforded a meaningful purpose. See id. The five-day rule of subsection (c) applies 
when the trial court does not set a specific time for filing a motion to suppress. 
Subsection (f), on the other hand, authorizes a trial court to set an earlier or later 
time than the five-day default time set in subsection (c). While the trial court could 
have excused Defendant's failure to timely file the motion to suppress for cause 
under subsection (f), it was not required to do so, nor should it have where it was 
ultimately dissatisfied with Defendant's untimely and general request. See R198:7; 
R199:6-7,10. 
Indeed, Defendant's reading of rule 12 would nullify subsection (f), which 
gives the trial court's discretion to set a time for filing a motion to suppress different 
than the default time established in subsection (c). Under Defendant's reading of 
the rule, a trial court has no discretion to require that a motion to suppress be filed 
any more than five days before trial. This is not sound policy. Not all pretrial 
motions can be adequately addressed in the last five — or as here, six days — before 
12 
trial, especially if they require an extensive evidentiary hearing. This will also be 
true if the trial court uses its discretion under rule 12(d)(3) to grant the parties 
"reasonable time" "to respond to the issue of fact and law in the motion and at the 
hearing." Moreover, the trial court itself will often require sufficient time to digest 
the parties' memorandums and issue a ruling. It may or may not be possible to 
accomplish all this in the last week before trial. The trijal court, which must manage 
its calendar, is in the best position to make that determination. Defendant's narrow 
reading of rule 12 would hamstring a trial court's ability to control its calendar and 
to adequately address pretrial motions. Requiring a trial court to hear all motions to 
suppress filed five days before trial would invariajbly result in additional trial 
continuances and encourage parties to delay filing th^ir motions in order to obtain 
continuances. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court acted 
well within its discretion to manage its calendar to refuse to entertain Defendant's 
untimely motion. Defendant was given several opportunities over the previous 
year to file his motion, yet he waited until the eleventh hour to do so. Indeed, he 
waited three months after the judge had already told|him it would only "possibly" 
entertain a later filed motion. The trial court cannot be faulted for denying 
Defendant an additional opportunity or for being reluctant to continue trial yet a 
fourth time. 
13 
Notwithstanding the above, Defendant asserts that the trial court "specifically 
stated that she would allow a motion to suppress to be filed before trial and would 
address it at trial/7 Aplt. Br. at 19. Defendant's characterization is not supported in 
the record. As shown in Part A, supra, the trial court made no definitive promise. 
See R198:8. 
C. Defendant has not shown any prejudice. 
Finally, Defendant makes no showing, as required by rule 103, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, that he was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to hear the motion to 
suppress: "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affectedf.]" Utah R. Evid. 103(a); 
accord State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, % 17, 999 P.2d 7 ("We will reverse an erroneous 
evidentiary ruling only if, 'absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that 
there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant. A reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome exists when the appellate court's confidence 
in the verdict actually reached is undermined7"). Indeed, defendant nowhere 
asserts, or attempts to show, that the motion to suppress would have been 
successful. See Aplt. Br. at 15-21. He thus fails, as a matter of law, to show that 
absent the alleged error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome. See Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f^ 17. His claim of error must therefore be rejected. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 23 November 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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